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Besides the structure of interactions within networks, also the interactions between networks are of the out-
most importance. We therefore study the outcome of the public goods game on two interdependent networks that
are connected by means of a utility function, which determines how payoffs on both networks jointly influence
the success of players in each individual network. We show that an unbiased coupling allows the spontaneous
emergence of interdependent network reciprocity, which is capable to maintain healthy levels of public coop-
eration even in extremely adverse conditions. The mechanism, however, requires simultaneous formation of
correlated cooperator clusters on both networks. If this does not emerge or if the coordination process is dis-
turbed, network reciprocity fails, resulting in the total collapse of cooperation. Network interdependence can
thus be exploited effectively to promote cooperation past the limits imposed by isolated networks, but only if
the coordination between the interdependent networks is not disturbed.
Not only are our social interactions limited and thus best
described not by well-mixed models but rather by models en-
tailing networks [1–3], it is also a fact that these networks
are often interconnected and indeed very much interdependent
[4, 6–8]. From the World economy to Google Circles, this in-
terdependence cannot be denied and is all but absent, and in
fact it is easily observable. Not necessarily so on the basis
of actual links between the networks, which arguably could
be the most hidden and difficult to identify feature of such
systems, but much more so based on the impact actions in one
network will have on the behavior in another network. Several
examples are provided in [9], which demonstrate vividly that
we live in a strongly interconnected World. More specifically,
seminal works on interdependent networks have shown that
even seemingly irrelevant changes in one network can have
catastrophic and very much unexpected consequence in an-
other network [4, 5]. Since the evolution of cooperation in hu-
man societies also proceeds on such interdependent networks,
it is thus of interest to determine to what extent the interde-
pendence influences the outcome of evolutionary games.
Preceding works concerning evolutionary games on indi-
vidual networks and graphs, as reviewed comprehensively in
[1, 10, 11], provide a stimulating starting point for explo-
rations on interdependent networks [12–14]. The discovery
of network reciprocity due to Nowak and May [15], which
demonstrated that the aggregation of cooperators into com-
pact clusters can protect them against invading defectors even
in the realm of the most challenging prisoner’s dilemma game,
launched a spree of research activity aimed at understanding
the evolution of cooperation in structured populations. Meth-
ods of statistical physics in particular [16], have proven very
valuable for this task, as evidenced by the seminal studies of
the evolution of cooperation on small-world [17, 18], scale-
free [19, 20], coevolving [21, 22], hierarchical [23] and bi-
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partite networks [24], to name only a few representative ex-
amples. Based on these studies it is now established that het-
erogeneous connections promote cooperation in all main so-
cial dilemmas [20], and that this is a very robust evolutionary
outcome [25], although not immune to the normalization of
payoffs [26–29] and targeted removal of nodes [30]. In fact,
heterogeneity in general, not just in terms of players having
different degree within a network, has proven to be very ef-
fective in maintaining high levels of cooperation in the pop-
ulation [31–39]. Moreover, many coevolutionary rules [11]
have been introduced that may generate such states sponta-
neously [40–48]. Adding to this the discovered relevance of
the population being structured rather than well-mixed for the
effectiveness of reward [49, 50], punishment [51–53], selec-
tion pressure [54], and bargaining [55–58], it is beyond doubt
that the added complexity of the interdependence between
networks will lead to the discovery of fascinating new insights
concerning how and why we so often choose socially respon-
sible actions over defection, despite the fact that large-scale
social experiments suggest otherwise [59].
Here we wish to contribute to the subject by studying the
evolution of public cooperation on two interdependent net-
works. In order to focus on the effects that are predominantly
due to the interdependence, we consider the square lattice as
an elementary interaction network and an evolutionary game
that is governed by group interactions, namely the spatial pub-
lic goods game [60]. The usage of this setup is motivated by
our desire to minimize other effects that could stem from net-
work complexity or pairwise interactions. Nevertheless, as we
will argue when presenting the results and the newly discov-
ered mechanism of interdependent network reciprocity, our
findings should apply to many other social scenarios as well.
In general, within the realm of evolutionary games, it is most
natural to assume that the interconnectedness will not allow
direct strategy exchanges between the networks, but rather af-
fect the utility function of players which influences the strat-
egy imitation probability within a network [12]. While tradi-
tionally the utility is considered to be the payoff of a player
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FIG. 1: Shifting weight from individual payoffs to average payoffs
of nearest neighbors in the evaluation of utility promotes the evo-
lution of public cooperation. Depicted is the stationary fraction of
cooperators ρC on both lattices in dependence on the normalized
multiplication factor r/G for different α = β values, as denoted
in the figure legend. Due to the payoff-coupling within and between
networks, there is a remarkable drop of critical r/G values that are
required for cooperators to survive and dominate on both networks.
Results were obtained by means of Monte Carlo (MC) simulations
using 2 × L × L = 2 × 300 × 300 system size and 2 × 105 MC
steps. Averages were determined from the last 104 MC steps.
as received from the games played with its interaction part-
ners, staging the game on interdependent networks opens up
the possibility of alternative, possibly interdependent formu-
lations of utility. A general example is when the payoff of a
player is not just due to the games with its neighbors in the
current network, but also due to its involvement in another
network. Two individuals with strong ties but working in sep-
arate environments, or the relation between two companies of
the same group but in different countries, can be character-
ized this way. We make use of these possibilities and propose
a simple network-symmetric formulation of utility based on
the payoff of player in the first network, as well as the average
payoffs of its neighbors on both the original and the second
network. While this formulation is not intended to model any
specific scenario, it captures relevantly the essence of interde-
pendent utilities. Notably, considering the payoffs of neigh-
bors provides a natural coupling within a network, which can
then be compared with the consequence of coupling between
networks. Importantly, as the definition of utility is symmet-
ric with respect to the two networks, there is no master-slave
relation between them. As we will show, this setup leads us
to the observation of interdependent network reciprocity. In
particular, if related players on both networks aggregate into
compact cooperative domains, then this form of reciprocity is
much more powerful than traditional network reciprocity on
an isolated network. On the other hand, even if some coopera-
tors aggregate into a compact domain in one network, they ul-
timately fail to survive in the absence of similarly aggregated
partners in the other network. Hence the term interdependent
network reciprocity.
Results
We first present results for α = β (see Methods for the de-
scription of the model and parameters), in which case the fo-
cus is mainly on the transition of importance from individual
payoffs to average payoffs of nearest neighbors in the evalu-
ation of utility. Naturally, as β increases the interdependence
between the two networks grows too (see Eq. 2), but it is im-
possible to attribute the reported effects unequivocally either
to the growing influence of group payoffs or to the growing
interdependence. As results presented in Fig. 1 show, simul-
taneously increasing both α and β continuously lowers the
minimally required multiplication factor r that is needed for
cooperator to survive. What is more, the span of r where co-
operators and defectors coexist shrinks too, ultimately leading
also to an ever-faster arrival to the pureC phase as r increases
further. More precisely, the minimally required r/G drops
from 0.748 for α = β = 0 to r/G = 0.33 for α = β = 0.45,
and correspondingly, the required r/G for complete coopera-
tor dominance drops from r/G = 1.09 to just r/G = 0.35.
This is certainly impressive and motivating for wanting to un-
derstand the mechanism behind the remarkable promotion of
public cooperation. Even before further results are presented,
however, it is clear that the transition of weight from individ-
ual payoffs to average payoffs of nearest neighbors in deter-
mining the utility of each player plays an important role. In
particular, the transition magnifies the benefit of C − C cou-
pling on both networks, yet this effect alone would be unable
to improve the viability of cooperators to such an extent as
reported in Fig. 1.
It is therefore of interest to decouple the impact of α and
β by eliminating the α = β restrain, as presented in Fig. 2,
where contour plots encode the stationary fraction of coop-
erators ρC for three different values of r/G. Regardless of
the multiplication factor, it can be observed that at any given
value of β, increasing α will elevate ρC . Note that increas-
ing α simply elevates the relevance of the payoffs of nearest
neighbors on the expense of individual payoffs on any given
FIG. 2: Shifting weight from individual payoffs to average payoffs of
nearest neighbors promotes the evolution of cooperation, but it is im-
portant whether the shift entails the average payoffs of neighbors on
the host network (α) or the average payoffs of neighbors on the other,
interdependent network (β). Depicted are contour plots showing the
stationary fraction of cooperators ρC in dependence on both α and
β for r/G = 0.4 (left), 0.7 (middle), and 0.8 (right). Increasing α
at any given β promotes the evolution of cooperation. The same is
true vice versa, only that the positive effect depends much more on
α and r/G, thus highlight the importance of an intact network reci-
procity on each individual network for increasing β to work. Details
of Monte Carlo simulations are the same as described in Fig. 1.
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FIG. 3: Cooperators and defectors on the two interdependent net-
works share exactly the same fate during the course of evolution,
i.e., as soon as the density of cooperator (defector) pairs starts de-
creasing (increasing) on one network, the same happens on the other
network. In the legend Pi and Pe mark the corresponding pair con-
figuration probabilities within (internal) and between (external) net-
works, respectively. The evolution is completely synchronous, with
quantitative differences emerging only due to the applied relatively
small value of β. Notably, for β → 0.5 the difference would be vir-
tually none. Parameter values used were: r/G = 0.7, α = 0.15, and
β = 0.5, at L = 300.
network, without modifying the level of interdependence be-
tween them. The impact of β at any given α, however, is less
clear-cut. Note that increasing β, however, also elevates the
relevance of the payoffs of nearest neighbors on the expense
of individual payoffs, but on separate networks, thus increas-
ing the level of interdependence between them. In general,
increasing β at a fixed value of α also elevates ρC levels, thus
suggesting that an increase in the interdependence of the util-
ity function also promotes public cooperation, similarly as the
increase of α at any given β. Yet the efficiency of increasing
β depends much more on α than vice versa. For low values
of α increasing β has a much more marginal impact than if
increasing β at high values of α. This difference in impact
also grows as r/G decreases. Both these facts indicate that
network reciprocity on each individual network is crucial for
higher β to take effect, as both lower values of α and r/G
make it increasingly difficult for cooperators to form compact
domains.
Having then established the relevance of traditional net-
work reciprocity on each individual network, it is next instruc-
tive to monitor the evolution of cooperation separately on the
two networks. In order to do so, we first examine how the frac-
tion ofC−C andD−D pairs varies separately on network A
and B for a characteristic combination of game parameters, as
presented in Fig. 3. Here Pi and Pe denote the fraction of the
related pair configurations within and between networks, re-
spectively. Accordingly, Pi(C,C) is the probability to find a
C−C pair in any given network, while Pe(C,C) is the proba-
bility to find a C −C link between the two networks. Besides
the initial fall of cooperators before the eventual rise, which is
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FIG. 4: Mixing the distribution of players in one of the two networks
disrupts the synchronous evolution of the two strategies, which re-
markably has dire consequences for the fate of cooperation on the
other network, despite the fact that the coupling of payoffs within the
network is still significant. The evolution of cooperation in the latter,
measured by the density of cooperators, is denoted dashed red. For
comparison, solid green line shows the time dependence in the same
network while the strategy evolution is not disturbed in the other net-
work. This experiment highlights that while traditional network reci-
procity alone can be inefficient, the chances of cooperators improve
dramatically if interdependent network reciprocity is allowed to take
effect. The applied system size was 2 × 200 × 200 at r/G = 0.7,
α = 0.15, and β = 0.5.
the hallmark signature indicating the spontaneous emergence
of spatial reciprocity, it is important to note just how synchro-
nized the rise (fall) and fall (rise) of D −D (C −C) pairs on
the two networks is. There is only a small quantitative differ-
ence inferable, but otherwise both cooperators and defectors
on the two networks share completely the same fate.
The question that now poses itself is just how important the
synchrony of the evolutionary process on the two interdepen-
dent networks is. As evidenced by the results presented in
Fig. 4, the importance can hardly be overstated. If we prevent
the spontaneous formation of cooperative domains in one of
the networks by applying a permanent mixing of strategies,
then this will negatively influence the evolution of coopera-
tion in the other (undisturbed) network as well. On the latter,
the cooperators will die out despite the fact that the coupling
within the network is still functioning via nonzero α, and that
thus the evolution of cooperation ought to be supported on this
undisturbed network. As can be observed, this intervention
on one of the networks will not only prevent the emergence
of synchronized evolution on the two networks, but will also
result in full defection in the undisturbed network in spite of
the fact that the two networks are not physically connected
(the corresponding evolution in the unperturbed network is
denoted by “disturbed” in Fig. 4). For comparison, we also
plot the evolution in the same network when the emergence
of parallel evolution was not disturbed (denoted by “free” in
Fig. 4). As the “free” line shows, cooperators can eventu-
ally spread widely even at parameter values where traditional
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FIG. 5: Direct observation of interdependent network reciprocity.
From left to right, panels (a)-(d) depict the evolution of cooperation
in one network, while panels (e)-(h) show the same for the other
network. Starting from a prepared initial state, only those circular
cooperative domains that are initially present on both networks, and
which can therefore make immediate use of interdependent network
reciprocity, survive and eventually spread across both networks. Co-
operators that are initially distributed uniformly at random, as well as
clustered cooperators present on one but not the other network, sur-
render under the evolutionary pressure from defectors already at the
early stages of evolution. The applied system size was 2×200×200
at r/G = 0.66, α = 0.15, and β = 0.5. Snapshots were taken at
t = 0, 100, 500 and 10000 MC steps.
single-network reciprocity would fail completely.
These results lead us to the coining of the term “interde-
pendent network reciprocity”, simply because if network reci-
procity fails on one network, it will inevitably fail also on the
other network. If it remains intact on both, however, and if the
interdependence via the utility function is sufficiently strong
to initialize spontaneous coordination between the two net-
works, then interdependent network reciprocity will strongly
outperform traditional single-network reciprocity, in fact lead-
ing to much higher levels of public cooperation, as evidenced
in Figs. 1 and 2. The mechanism of interdependent network
reciprocity can be demonstrated most beautifully by means of
characteristic snapshots of the two interdependent networks
as obtained from a prepared initial state. Figure 5 shows that
only the one circular cooperative domain is able to survive the
initial onslaught of defectors, namely the one that is initially
present on both networks, but not the other two which are ini-
tially present on only one network. Notably, other cooperators
that are initially distributed uniformly at random, and which
could potentially be saved by traditional single-network reci-
procity, die out fast too. Thus, only those cooperators that can
make immediate use of interdependent network reciprocity
survive and eventually spread across both networks.
Lastly it is of interest to elaborate on the generality of the
identified interdependent network reciprocity. To do so, we
consider an alternative setup entailing three symmetrically in-
terdependent networks with the governing utility function be-
ing
UX = (1− α− 2β)Px + α〈Px〉+ β〈Px′ 〉+ β〈Px′′ 〉 . (1)
Here x′ and x′′ denote the related players of player x in the
corresponding networks. In this way every network is con-
FIG. 6: Interdependent network reciprocity works also one more than
two symmetrically interdependent networks. Like for two networks,
for three interdependent networks shifting weight from individual
payoffs to average payoffs of nearest neighbors also promotes the
evolution of cooperation, but it is important whether the shift en-
tails the average payoffs of neighbors on the host network (α) or the
average payoffs of neighbors on the other, interdependent network
(β). For interdependent network reciprocity to work best, a thresh-
old value of α ≈ 0.17 needs to be surpassed. The applied system size
was 3× L× L = 3× 400× 400 and 5× 105 MC steps were used,
while the value of r/G = 0.7 was the same as used in the middle
panel of Fig. 2, which thus also serves as a comparison reference.
nected with two other networks in a symmetric way, with-
out any master-slave preferences. As in the originally studied
model, strategy imitation is allowed only between players re-
siding on the same network, but never between players from
different networks. As results presented in Fig. 6 show, the
impact of different α and β values is qualitatively the same as
reported in Fig. 2 for the two-network setup. In particular, it
can be observed that at any given value of β, increasing α will
elevate ρC , while increasing β at a fixed value of α also ele-
vates ρC levels, but it requires a threshold value of α to be sur-
passed for the interdependent network reciprocity to become
really effective. Altogether, these results indicate clearly that
the spontaneous emergence of coordination and subsequent
synchronization of the evolutionary process is possible also if
more than two networks are interdependent. Further on the
generality of interdependent network reciprocity, we remind
that the outcome of public goods games is in general inde-
pendent of the interaction topology [60], and therefore a sim-
ilar impact can be expected also if the topology of individual
networks is different from the square lattice. Moreover, since
social dilemma games governed by pairwise interactions were
recently also found to be susceptible to the “wisdom of group”
effect [61], we argue that interdependent network reciprocity
should be observable straightforwardly by them as well. More
challenging setups, which would be of interest to study more
accurately in the future, would entail determining to what de-
gree the network topology of each individual network forming
the interdependent system is allowed to differ before for inter-
dependent network reciprocity to remain intact.
Discussion
Summarizing, we have studied the evolution of cooperation
in the public goods game on interdependent networks that
are subject to interconnectedness by means of a network-
symmetric definition of utility. Strategy imitation has been
5allowed only between players residing on the same network,
but not between players on different networks. We have
shown first that, in general, increasing the relevance of
the average payoff of nearest neighbors on the expense of
individual payoffs in the evaluation of utility increases the
survivability of cooperators. More importantly, however, we
have shown that while doing this for the coupling between
individual and group payoffs on a given network simply
reinforces network reciprocity, applying the same coupling of
payoffs between networks has a much more interesting and
in fact unexpected outcome. In particular, we have identified
the spontaneous emergence of the so-called interdependent
network reciprocity. The later implies that if cooperative
players on network A aggregate into compact domains while
the corresponding players on network B fail to do so (or vice
versa due to the network-symmetric definition of utility),
the mechanism of network reciprocity will ultimately fail
on both networks. On the other hand, if players on network
A aggregate and the corresponding players on network B
do too, then the evolution of cooperation will be promoted
much stronger than based on traditional single-network
reciprocity alone. At this point it is important to note that
players between the networks are not physically connected,
nor are they allowed to imitate strategy from one another. The
coordination of clustering of cooperators on both networks is
a spontaneous process that is thus brought about solely by the
interdependence of utility. We have shown the mechanism of
interdependent network reciprocity to be robust against the
number of interdependent networks, and we have provided
arguments in favor of robustness against variations of the
structure of each individual network, as well against the type
of the governing evolutionary game played. Overall, our
research indicates that the interdependence of interaction
networks can be exploited effectively to promote public
cooperation past the limits imposed by isolated networks, al-
though this is subject to warranting undisturbed coordination
of the distribution of strategies on the two networks, which
in turn requires a sufficiently strong interdependence of utility.
Methods
The public goods game on both networks is staged on a
L×L square lattice with periodic boundary conditions, where
players are arranged into overlapping groups of size G = 5.
Every player is thus surrounded by its k = G − 1 nearest
neighbors and is a member in g = G different groups. Ini-
tially each player on site x in network A and on site x′ in
network B is designated either as a cooperator C or defector
D with equal probability. The accumulation of payoffs Px
and Px′ on both networks follows the same standard proce-
dure. Namely, in each group cooperators contribute 1 to the
public good while defectors contribute nothing. The sum of
contributions is subsequently multiplied by the factor r > 1,
reflecting the synergetic effects of cooperation, and the result-
ing amount is equally shared amongst the G group members.
In each group the payoff obtained is P gx on network A and
P gx′ on network B, while the total amount received in all the
groups is thus Px =
∑
g P
g
x and Px′ =
∑
g P
g
x′ .
While the two networks are not physically connected, inter-
dependence is introduced via the utility function
Ux = (1− α− β)Px + α〈Px〉+ β〈Px′〉 , (2)
where 〈Px〉 and 〈Px′〉 are the average payoffs of all four
neighbors of players x and x′ on their host lattices, respec-
tively. It is important to note that this definition is network-
symmetric. The evaluation of Ux′ is identical if the indexes (′)
for the two networks are switched, and thus there is no master-
slave relation between them. The later was considered previ-
ously in [12], but it constitutes and entirely different setup. In
accordance with the proposed symmetric definition of utility
as given by Eq. 2, increasingα and/or β, within the limitations
of the condition (α+β) < 1, puts more emphasis on the pay-
offs of the neighbors, while at the same time decreasing the
relevance of individual payoffs. As expected, larger values
of α promote cooperation, but the consequence of increasing
β is hardly foreseeable as there is no direct information ex-
change between the networks via strategy imitation. Setting
β = 0 decouples the two networks and more specifically, at
α = β = 0 we regain the traditional spatial public goods
game on both square lattices, where, as reported in [60], co-
operators die out if the multiplication factor r decreases below
a threshold, depending also on the uncertainty governing the
strategy adoptions K (see Eq. 3 below). For K = 0.5, which
we will use throughout this work without loss of generality,
the critical value is r/G = 0.748.
Following the determination of utilities of players accord-
ing to Eq. 2, strategy imitation is possible only between near-
est neighbors on any given lattice, but never between players
residing on different networks. We emphasize that this re-
strain, in addition to the network-symmetric formulation of
utility, are the two key considerations of the present setup.
Accordingly, on network A player x can adopt the strategy
sy of one of its randomly chosen nearest neighbors y with a
probability determined by the Fermi function
W (sy → sx) =
1
1 + exp[(Ux − Uy)/K]
, (3)
where the utility Uy of player y is evaluated identically as for
player x. The probability of strategy invasion from player y′
to player x′ on network B is determined likewise, only that
utilities U ′x and U ′y are used. Simulations of the model were
performed by means of a random sequential update, where
each player on both networks had a chance to pass its strategy
once on average during a Monte Carlo (MC) step. The linear
system size was varied from L = 100 to 600 in order to avoid
finite size effects, and the equilibration required up to 105 MC
steps.
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